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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant, Timothy Leonard Wood, appeals from 
Hrnunary judgment entered in the Fifth Judicial District 
Court, State of Utah, in favor of Respondents and dismiss-
ing Appellant's Complaint. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant filed his Complaint and alleged an action 
in wrongful death. Respondents answered and raised the 
dr'iC'nsc of the Utah Guest Statute. Discovery proceeded and 
fiv~ depositions were taken. On the 25th day of May, 1983, 
Respondents filed a Motion for Sununary Judgment asking th, 
Court to dismiss Appellant's Complaint. Respondents did 
not support their motion with affidavits, but simultaneous; 
with the filing of the Motion for Sununary Judgment filed 
Motion to Publish Depositions. Appellant did not file 
opposing affidavits, but did file Abstracts of Deoositi%c; 
in Opposition to the Motion for Sununary Judgment. 
The Court entered sununary judgment in favor of 
Respondents and dismissed Appellant's Complaint. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Appellant seeks reversal of the summary judo-
ment and seeks to have the case remanded for further proc,2c;-
ings. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Inasmuch as this appeal is taken from summary 
ruling in the lower court, no transcript of testimony is 
available and this statement of facts is supported only ~ 
reference to documents in the Court file and depositions 
relied upon by both parties. 
Appellant's minor son sustained personal injuries 
resulting in death in a one automobile accident which 
occurred on the 23rd day of April, 1982. (Ruesch depo , 
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f>. 77, 1. 5-12). Respondent, Winston Stratton, was the 
'"·'·i:r·r of the automobile involved (Memorandum of Points and 
Auth<>rities filed by Respondents on the 26th day of June, 
l~R3) and his minor son, Tracy Stratton, was the driver of 
said automobile. 
cr,rnr·l aint). 
(Gubler depo., p. 40, 1. 6-8; Answer to 
Seven persons occupied the vehicle, one of which 
~a> the deceased, Timothy Johnathan Wood. Three in the 
front and four in the bac~. Dawnette Gubler was sitting 
nn the console between the driver's seat and the passenger's 
seat in the front. (Gubler depo., p. 30-31). 
The accident occured on a curve in an asphalt 
covered road. The vehicle was traveling in a southerly 
Jir~ctinn in the right lane. (Gubler depo., p. 41, 1. 53-
5 4) . In the middle of the curve is a depression in the 
asphalt roadway. The depression is 2li - 3li feet deep in 
the left lane of said road. (Gubler depo., o. 53, 1. 2-13) 
Respondent, Tracy Stratton, was familiar with said 
road ilnd dip. (Ha depo., p. 21, 1. 11-25; p. 22, 1. 1-3; 
Gla2ier depo., p. 9, 1. 1-14; p. 9, 1. 24-25; p. 10, 1. 1-4; 
1•. 10, 1. 11-17; p. 11, 1. 1-11; p. 14, 1. 7-11). 
On the day of the accident and at the time of the 
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same, Respondent was driving a Ford Bronco at an est 1111at 1 
speed of 60 - 65 miles per hour (Gubler depo., p. 67, ! . 
14-22) and the speed limit was 40 miles per hour (Gubltr 
depo., p. 42, 1. 17-23). 
The speed at which said Respondent was operillH: 
said vehicle was such, as the vehicle entered the curve, 
that the passenger, Gail Ann Ruesch, exclaimed, "Stor'• 
let me out. Let me out." (Ruesch depo., p. 24, 1. lG-1!1. 
Immediately prior to enterina said depression in the rc0!· 
way, the vehicle was being driven on the right side: c,f ti, 
road and then swerved over to the left side and hit the 
depression at an angle. (Gubler depo., p. 47, 1. 12-1'7). 
The driver, Tracy Stratton, turned the vehicle into the 
lef~ lane of traffic while negotiating the curve. (Gubl 
depo., p. 51, 1. 8-25). It is the testimony of Dawnettr~ 
Gubler that the driver, Respondent, switched lanes to ~c• 
a better angle on the depression to fascilitate greater 
lift of the vehicle. (Gublerdepo., p. 47, 1. 12-17;p. 
52, 1. 1-2). The Bronco then became airborne. (Gubler 
depo., p. 58, 1. 9-17). 
After leaving the depression the vehicle tra'.'cc' 
the length of a football field. (Gubler depo., p. 67, l 
23-24). The vehicle was swerving from side to side Jn! 
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anJ rolled several times. (Gubler depo., p. 43, 1. 7-20). 
There is some evidence that the young men involved, 
including the driver, intended to frighten the girls and made 
plans to do so shortly prior to entering the Bronco vehicle 
fur the drive which resulted in the injuries and death 
(Ha depo., p. 16, 1. 17-25; p. 17, 1. 1-8). 
Tl1ot the drive was intended by the boys to frighten the girls 
is further supported by the testimony of one of the female 
11assenacrs, Gail Ann Ruesch. (Ruesch depo., p. 36, 1. 2-9). 
l\RGUMENT 
POINT 
THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING RESPOND 
ENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
WHERE GENUINE ISSUES OF FACT EXIST. 
Respondents did not support their Motion for Summary 
lticLimcnt ,,•ith affidavits and did submit a memorandum in 
suuuurt of the motion and relied upon the depositions of 
four nf the surviving occupants to support their position 
lhdl the Complaint should be dismissed. Respondents also 
subniitlcd the Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to local 
1ule 2.S and at no time prior to entry of summary judgment 
Ju• sled a hearing on the motion. 
Appellant relied upon the depositions to oppose 
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the motion. 
Rule 56 (e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
states in part, 
when a motion for summary judqment 
is made and supported as provided in 
this rule, an adverse party may not 
rest upon the mere allegations or 
denials of his pleadings, but his res-
ponse, by affidavit or as otherwise 
provided in this rule, must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is 
a genuine issue for trial. If he does 
not so respond, summary judgment, 
if appropriate, shall be entered 
against him. (emphasis added). 
Respondents did not support their Motion for 
Summary Judgment with affidavits. Respondents re 1 ied upon 
the cepositions of witnesses to support their motion. A 
reading of those depositions indicates that there is suf-
ficient evidence for reasonable minds to conclude that 
Respondent, Tracy Stratton, engaged in willful misconduct 
which was a proximate cause of the death of Timothy 
Johnathan Wood. 
Rule 56 (e), provides that if a Motion for Summan 
Judgment is supported as provided for by said rule, and if 
the other parties fail to respond and raise issues of 
material fact, the Court shall, if appropriate, enter 
summary judgment against the nonresponding party. 
-6-
The Respondents, having failed to support their 
i'lt'l ion for Surrunary Judgment with affidavits and having 
relied upon depositions of witnesses, which will be called 
by Aopellant, summary judgment for Respondents is not 
u1)uruprj ate. Those depositions contained testimony and 
,v1dence which could allow reasonable minds to conclude 
ll1C1t Resoondent, Tracy Stratton, engaged in willful mis-
conduct. 
As a result of Respondents failing to support 
treir motion with affidavits and indicating their intention 
to rely upon said depositions, Appellant could reasonably 
rely upon those depositions to oopose the surrunary judgment 
that had been submitted by Respondents. 
If the deoositions contain testimony which is 
';c1fficient to raise material issues of fact, the surrunary 
iu~~mcnt granted to Resoondents is inappropriate. 
Respondents relied upon the standard of "Willful 
Misconduct" as set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in Stack 
'~·_Ke~r:I'~~· Utah, 221 P.2d 594 (1950), at page 597, which 
is as follows: 
The intentional doing of an act or 
intentional failing to do an act, with 
knowledge that serious injury is a prob-
able and not merely possible result, or 
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the intentional doing of an act with 
wanton and reckless disregard of the 
possible consequences. It involves 
deliberate, intentional or wanton 
conduct in doing or omitting to do 
an act with knowledge or appreciation 
that injury is likely to result there-
from. 
Appellant agrees with the standard set forth iri 
the Stack case. In that case, at the close of the trio\, 
the jury rendered a verdict of "no cause of action" agillr,': 
the plaintiff. Thereafter, the trial court granted the 
plaintiff's Motion for a New Trial. At the second trial 
the jury verdict was in favor of plaintiff. 
The SupreMe Court concluded that the evidence 
sufficient that " ... the jury might well infer that the 
defendant was driving much to fast for existing condition' 
and further found that the jury had acted properly and 
sufficient evidence was before the same to conclude that 
defendant had engaged in willful misconduct. 
The fcicts in the Stack case were that the defer.:• 
driver had three (3) other persons in his vehicle initi1ll· 
and started up fast. A passenger remarked "take it easy" 
and the defendant slowed the vehicle down. Later in the 
journey defendant was driving "pretty fast" as the car W' 
over a dip, it seemed that defendant temporarily lost C·"· 
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of the car. Plaintiff noticed that a female passenger was 
friohtened and requested that defendant slow down. Defendant 
col owed the vehicle. After discharging a female passenger 
tl1e defendant drove at a moderate speed and then began to 
rick ur speed as he approached a curve and he accelerated 
and braked the car at the same time as the car started 
The car skidded around the curve and 
lc>ft the oiled surface. No accident resulted. Again a 
mGle passenger asked defendant to slow down. Defendant 
lauo)1c'l it off and increased his soeed as approaching another 
cCJn'c. .l\s defendant entered the second curve he again 
l>rak0d and accelerated at the same time, the car swerved 
sideways around the curve, went out of control, swerved to 
the other side of the road, skidded, hit the bridge abut-
ment and turned over. 
The facts in the instant case are similar if not 
mere eqreqious. Within a week prior to the accident, 
respondent, Tracy Stratton, had driven said road and neg-
otiated said depression. 
Seven persons were in the automobile at the time 
of the accident, three in the front seat and four in the 
(Gubler depo., p. 30-31). Dawnette Gubler was 
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sitting on the console between the driver's seat and u,~ 
passenger seat in the front. (A seating arrangement whicr 
is prohibited by section 41-6-108, U.C.A., (1953, as amende·, 
The driver was exceeding the speed limit by some 20 - 25 
miles per hour. One female asked the driver to stop and 
let her out. In the curve and just before the depression 
in the road, the driver turned the vehicle into the opposit; 
lane of traffic, passed through the depression and the vehk' 
became airborne. The driver then lost control and the 
vehicle rolled several times resulting in the death of 
Timothy Johnathan Wood and Diane Gubler. 
The standard of willful misconduct is set forth 
in th<0 Stack case in the alternative. The second al ternat>. 
definition is" ... the intentional doing of an act with 
wanton and reckless disregard of the possible consequences. 
p. 597. 
The intentional acts of the driver, Tracy Stratu· 
were as follows: 
1. Improper loading the vehicle with passengers. 
2. Driving on a known curved and dangerous ro~ 
in excess of a posted speed limit. 
3. Switching lanes in a curve. 
There is a fourth point which is implicit in U" 
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testimony of the witnesses and that is the driver acceler-
0ted and switched lanes intentionally to hit the depression 
0t such an angle as to give his vehicle the greatest lift 
possible in an attempt to make the vehicle airborne. In 
other words, the actions of the driver were intended by the 
driver to cause him to become airborne, i.e. loose control 
of the vehicle. 
Even if the evidence cited from the depositions 
is disputed, there is sufficient evidence therein, that 
reasonable minds could conclude that the driver engaged in 
~illful misconduct resulting in death. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED PROCEDURELY IN 
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO 
RESPONDENTS. 
Respondents filed their Motion for Summary Judgment 
nn the 26th day of May, 1983, toqether with their Memorandum 
in Support thereof. The motion was submitted under Rule 
2.8 and without affidavits. 
Respondents' motion was not noticed for hearing by 
e1ther counsel. On the 7th day of June, 1983, the Court 
,·aJled the matter before the Court. No counsel was present 
and the matter was passed. On the 8th day of June, 1983, 
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the court again called the matter and with no counsel beii,, 
present a minute entry was made stating, "Court to rev 1 ~w 
and rule." 
Prior to the Court ruling thereon, and on the 
14th day of June, 1983, in opposition to Respondents' Motir. 
for Summary Judgment, Appellant filed an Abstract of 
Deposition. On the fol lowing day Appellant filed a Requect 
for Hearing. On the 16th day of June, 1983, Appellant fil~ 
two more Abstracts of Depositions in opposition. Also on 
the 16th day of June, 1983, the Court entered summary 
judgment on behalf of Respondents. 
Appellant being unaware that summary j ucJgment hai 
been entered against him, continued to file documents 
relating to his opposition to Respondents' motion and 
filed said documents on the 17th day of June, the 21st da'/ 
of June, and the 22nd day of June, 1983. 
The Appellant gives the above recitation to 
indicate that the file has sufficient documentation therei'1 
to establish issues of material fact. 
Five depositions have been taken in this case. 
The deposition of Tracy Stratton was scheduled for June 
27, 1983, and had been arranged with the Court Reporter 
since the last week in April. The deposition of Winstori 
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Stratton is yet to be taken and other discovery may be 
ncc0ssary. The case is not at issue and sununary judgment 
is premature and inappropriate. 
When a moving party relies solely upon the 
depositions of witnesses to support a Motion for Sununary 
:flldciment and the depositions themselves contain testimony 
and 0vidcnce sufficient to raise issues of fact, the 
rnovinq parties are not entitled to sununary judgment and 
summary judgment is not appropriate as contemplated by 
Rule 56(e) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
POINT III 
THE PARENT, AUTOMOBILE OWNER, HEREIN 
IS LIABLE UNDER SECTION 41-2-22 UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED (1953,, AS AMENDED). 
The Respondents' Answer and Memorandum admits 
that Winston Stratton is the father of Tracy Stratton and 
the owner of the automobile in question. In Strange v. 
~s~_l_und, (Utah) 594 P.2d 881, the Utah Supreme 
Court held that Section 41-2-22 does apply in a situation 
where the willful misconduct of the minor driver is in 
issue. As indicated by the Strange case, a parent can be 
fc•unrl 1 iable for the willful misconduct of the minor 
rl1ivcr. Respondents rely on Eckols vs. Anderson, 27 U 2d 
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74, 493 P.2d 304 to support it's proposition that w1 llfuJ 
misconduct of a minor driver is not sufficient to imposro 
liability upon the owner. The Eckols opinion was rendered 
in 1972, whereas the Strange vs. Ostlund opinion was 
rendered in 1979. The Utah Supreme Court discusses the 
Eckols opinion in the Strange case and distinguishes the 
same. 
The files and records herein contain sufficient 
admissions by Respondent, Winston Stratton, to establish 
that he is the father of Tracy Stratton and the owner of 
the automobile in question. 
Section 41-2-22, U.C.A. (1953, as amended) proviicc 
for parental liability under the facts admitted to by 
Respondent, Winston Stratton, in the event it is found that 
his son, Tracy Stratton, committed wilful misconduct. 
SUMMARY 
At the time the District Court entered summary 
judgment for Respondents, they had submitted only a memor-
andum and depositions of four witnesses to support their 
motion. Those depositions contain testimony of witnesses 
sufficient to allow the trier of fact to reasonably concl 
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tl,ctt Respondent, Tracy Stratton, while operating a motor 
vehicle, intentionally engaged in acts or intentionally 
fdiled to act, with knowledge that serious injury was the 
probable and not merely a possible result of his actions. 
Further, the testimony from those depositions is sufficient 
to raise material issues of fact as to whether or not 
Tracy Stratton intentionally acted with wanton and reck-
less misconduct of the possible consequences. Also 
reasonable persons could conclude that Tracy Stratton, 
while driving the vehicle, engaged in activities deliberately, 
intentionally and with wanton conduct with knowledge or 
appreciation that injuries were likely to result therefrom. 
Rule 56(e) contemplates that the Court, when 
considering a Motion for Su!T\1'1ary Judgment, will review 
the documents submitted by the moving parties and will 
grant summary judgment only if said documents support that 
party's position. When a party moves for summary judgment 
and supports the same with depositions that contain 
testimony that will defeat the motion, it is inappropriate 
for the Court to grant summary judgment. The depositions 
submitted by respondents were replete with testimony of 
th~ willful misconduct of the minor driver. 
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The Court erred in granting sununary judqment 
when one Abstract of Deposition was filed two days prior 
to the Court having ruled on the Respondents' motion and 
when a Request for Hearing was filed one day prior to the 
ruling. 
In a wrongful death action extensive discovery 
is usually in order. With discovery having not been 
complete at the time the Court entered sununary judgment, 
said ruling was inappropriate. 
The parent, automobile owner, is not entitled to 
sununary judgment when testimony was before the Court, 
which was sufficient to raise material issues of fact 
regarding the willful misconduct of the minor driver. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing agruments, Appellant 
respectfully submits that the sununary judgment should be 
reversed and the case remanded to the lower court for 
further proceedings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED 
-~\; ~~--- \,[, 
iffi R. Scarth 
Attorney for Appellant 
-16-
